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Restricting Double-hatting To
Safeguard International
Arbitrations
Yasaschandra Devarakonda
Abstract
Double-hatting is when an individual plays the dual
role of an arbitrator and a legal counsel—a concept first
introduced by Professor P. Sands during an IBA conference
in 2009. While it hampers the credibility of the arbitral
process, its proponents oppose a complete prohibition
reflecting on its benefits. The author hypothesises that this
issue has been inadequately addressed in international
commercial arbitrations in juxtaposition to international
investment arbitrations.
Supporting this, the author
introduces the concept, tracing its judicial landscape and
scholarly discourse in investment arbitrations highlighting
the need to adopt a similar approach in commercial
arbitrations. Thereafter, the definition of double-hatting in
Article 6 (May 2020) and Article 4 (June 2021) of the draft
Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement is analyzed while concurrently proposing an
analogous definition for international commercial
arbitrations. Lastly, the author proposes a framework to
restrict double-hatting to counteract its negative implications
in international commercial arbitration.
I.
Introduction
Arbitrators are referred to as judges freely chosen
by the parties while equating the arbitral process to that of
the courts. Independence of arbitrators must be ensured at
Final year, B.A. LL.B, Undergraduate law student, National Law University
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all costs as they have a free reign to decide the law, as well
as the facts of the case, and are not subjected to appellate
review. 1 First introduced in a 2009 International Bar
Association (“IBA”) conference, double-hatting is a
prevalent practice in the international arbitration
community.2 The precise scale of the extent of its impact,
however, only came into light after the introduction of the
PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database
(“PITAD”) in 2017. 3 Although the database primarily
focused on treaty-based investment arbitrations, the study
noted that in 47% of the total number of studied cases, at
least one of the arbitrators was simultaneously playing the
role of a legal counsel.4 The numbers left the arbitration
world dumbfounded, grappling for the need to resolve the
issue of double-hatting.
The most sought-after Canadian approach, via the
test of reasonableness, to determine the arbitrator’s
impartiality of bias is crucial for a definitive solution to
double-hatting.5 This approach, also acknowledged by the
International Court of Justice, postulates the “general
incompatibility” between adjudicatory and advocacy roles.6
In the absence of sufficient safeguards against the
recognized incompatibility, double-hatting creates a
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,
145–50 (1968).
2
Dennis H. Hranitzky & Eduardo Silva Romero, The ‘Double Hat’ Debate in
International
Arbitration,
N.Y.
L.J.
1
(June
14,
2010),
https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/knowledge/publicatio
n/2010/6/the-double-hat-debate-in-internationalarbitration/070101031Dechert.pdf.
3
Malcolm Langford & Daniel Behn, Managing Backlash: The Evolving
Investment Treaty Arbitrator?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 551, 556 (2018).
4
Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Lie, The Revolving Door in
International Investment Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 301, 308 (2017).
5
Szilard v. Szasz, [1955] S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
6
Langford et al., supra note 4; Adhiraj Lath, Hang Up the Double Hat:
Safeguarding Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration, 1 NUJS JODR 2, 28 (2021),
https://jodr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/3.-Hang-up-the-Double-HatAdhiraj-Lath.pdf.
1
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reasonable apprehension of bias. This highlights the absence
of “institutional impartiality” in international investment
arbitrations and further questions the legitimacy and
credibility of the arbitral process. 7 Numerous judicial
pronouncements attesting a similar view have determined
against arbitrators as double-hatters, disqualifying those who
have “formerly acted as counsel to a party concerning
matters unrelated to the arbitration proceeding.”8
However, proponents of double-hatting argue
against a complete prohibition, pivoting on the argument that
there are a limited number of arbitrators across jurisdictions
specializing in multifarious fields such as maritime
arbitrations, sports arbitrations, etc. 9 With the rise in the
number of disputes, a complete prohibition would limit the
pool of arbitrators and lead to reappointments over time.
The eventuality is seemingly possible due to the lack of
incentive for the next generation of legal counsel to assume
the role of arbitrators. 10 The author, thus, opines that an
absolute limitation is not an appropriate alternative.11
The scope of the scholarly discourse on doublehatting is stunted to international investment arbitrations.
Perhaps hidden behind the veil of confidentiality, the field of
international commercial arbitrations was left untouched.
Arguments in favour of double-hatting, primarily drawn
from the works of scholars such as Shapiro and Stone Sweet,
pivoted on the “impartiality” and “wisdom” of the disputed
resolvers and hence its irrelevance in international

Joshua Tayar, Safeguarding the Institutional Impartiality of Arbitration in the
Face of Double-Hatting, 5 MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 107, 111 (2018).
8
Id. (citing Sumner v Barnhill (1879), 12 N.S.R. 501 (Can.)); see also
Ghirardosi v. Minister of Highways for British Columbia, [1966] S.C.R. 367
(Can.); Bank of Montreal v. Brown (2007), 359 N.R. 194 (FCA) (Can.).
9
Tayar, supra note 7, at 107–109; Hranitzky & Romero, supra note 4.
10
Hranitzku & Romero, supra note 2, at 1–2.
11
Id.
7
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commercial arbitrations.12 The author finds this approach to
be problematic. 13 If legitimacy and credibility are indeed a
concern in arbitration, then the same must apply to
international commercial arbitrations as well. The lack of
safeguards against double-hatting in international
commercial arbitrations would equally hamper the dispute
resolution process. The author, therefore, argues in favour
of a restriction, in juxtaposition to a prohibition, of doublehatting in both investment and commercial arbitrations
alike.14 With under-inclusion of international commercial
arbitrations in double-hatting as a premise, the author will
critically analyze Article 6 of the draft Code of Conduct for
Adjudicators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
proposing possible adaptations to arrive at a comprehensive
definition suitable for international investment arbitrations
and a standard for double-hatting suitable for international
commercial arbitrators.15 Thereafter, a potential framework
for implementation of the restriction on double-hatting is
also proposed with the aid of legislations and soft law
instruments.
II.
Defining Double-hatting in International
Investment Arbitrations and International Commercial
Arbitrations: Difference in Approaches
Article 6 of the first draft code, 2020 defines
double-hatting as:
Limit on Multiple Roles
Adjudicators shall [refrain from acting]/ [disclose
that they act] as counsel, expert witness, judge, agent or in
See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (1981); Alec S. Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of
Governance, 32 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 147, 147 (1999).
13
Hranitzku & Romero, supra note 3, at 1–2.
14
Id.
15
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID), DRAFT CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR ADJUDICATORS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
1, 16–19, Article 6 (May 2020) [hereinafter ICSID CODE OF CONDUCT],
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/Draft_Code_Condu
ct_Adjudicators_ISDS.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
12
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any other relevant role at the same time as they are [within
X years of] acting on matters that involve the same parties,
[the same facts] [and/ or] [the same treaty].16
This is perhaps the first formal attempt to define the
term “double-hatting.”
By regarding the scope and
relevance of imposing limitations on the practice of doublehatting, the author would be borrowing the text of Article 6
while proposing a comprehensive definition for doublehatting in international commercial arbitrations.
As understood from the above-mentioned case law
and comments, double-hatting is a practice which might
raise suspicion of bias.17 The author identifies three crucial
parameters that need adequate consideration in defining
double-hatting: first, the personnel involved in the practice
of double-hatting. 18 This could be an arbitrator, legal
counsel, or witness.19 Second, the duration of time for which
the suspicion of bias or conflict would exist is also
important.20 Third, we should examine circumstances where
dual roles may be considered as double-hatting.21
Firstly, Article 6 identifies counsel, expert
witnesses, judges, and agents while leaving open an ejusdem
generis interpretation of the term “or in any other relevant
Id.
See Tayar, supra note 7; Langfor et al., supra note 4.
18
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID), CODE OF
CONDUCT-BACKGROUND PAPERS DOUBLE-HATTING 1, 1 n.2 (2020)
[hereinafter
ICSID
DOUBLE-HATTING],
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Background_Papers_DoubleHatting_(final)_2021.02.25.pdf.
19
Id.
20
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, SADC MODEL
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE WITH COMMENTARY 1, 62–63
(2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-ModelBIT-Template-Final.pdf.
21
Amanda Nerea & Ronald Mutasa, Double-hatting in International
Arbitration: Time to close the Revolving Door?, June 2019, at 1,
https://www.africaarbitrationacademy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Double-Hatting-in-International-Arbitration-Timeto-close-the-Revolving-Door-By-Amanda-Nerea-and-Ronald-Mutasa-14-0619.pdf.
16
17
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role.”22 The author argues that this broad identification leads
to the imposition of too many restrictions on personnel,
which gives parties the leeway to file for dismissals under
nefarious grounds, creating otherwise avoidable delays. In
an arbitration, the most crucial players are the arbitrators and
legal counsel. In the context of investment arbitrations, the
crucial players would be the judges, on the one hand, and on
the other hand, the agent on behalf of the state and the
counsel on behalf of the investor. The author argues that
expert witnesses must not be included in the list of people on
whom restrictions with regards to the practice of doublehatting are identified. An arbitral tribunal has the discretion
with respect to the evidentiary aspects, including the
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the
evidence submitted by both the parties.23 In a circumstance
where the witness is the only double-hatter, the opposite
party could raise objections with respect to the witnesses’
reliability, or the tribunal, on its own volition, could dismiss
the witness and disregard the evidence submitted. 24
Therefore, insofar as the witnesses are concerned, it is a
question of the reliability of the witness. If a witness is a
double-hatter, the witness could be categorized as unreliable
and all the documentary and oral evidence may be
disregarded.
Additionally, the inclusion of the expert witness in
Article 6 goes unexplained. Ordinarily, there exists two
kinds of witnesses; witnesses of fact and expert witness—
usually appointed by either of the parties or although rarely
exercised, by the arbitral tribunal itself.25 Potential conflict
by double-hatting could arise even in the case of a witness
of fact; if, for instance, the witness is playing the role of legal
ICSID CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 15.
RETO MARGHITOLA, DOCUMENT PRODUCTION IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 21 (2015).
24
See Langford et al., supra note 4, at 319–21.
25
JEFFREY WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBTRATION 895 (2012).
22
23
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counsel in another arbitration involving the same company
or similar facts, etc. Because the author argues that such
instances will question the reliability of the witness anyway,
there is no need to include any kind of witness within the
scope of double-hatting.26
The limitation in Article 6, however, is that the text
does not offer an option to pick and choose personnel.27 It
states, “as counsel, expert witness, judge, agent . . . .” 28
Despite the lack of provision watering this down, because it
is a first draft, on the first prong, the author suggests the
following:
Parameter International
International
investment
commercial
arbitrations
arbitrations
Personnel
Judges, Agents, or Arbitrators
or
Legal Counsel.
Legal Counsel.
Table 1 Parameter defined—Personnel.29
Secondly, Article 6 touches upon the crucial aspect
of the time duration. 30 The drafted text does not
conclusively provide for the time for which the dual roles
must be restricted.31 However, its commentary offers two
alternatives. 32 Restrictions can either be placed for the
duration of the concurrent arbitrations or for a time duration
of two years.33 This time duration is crucial, as at the end of
the determined period double-hatting should not lead to any
negative implications. For instance, if an individual plays
the role of an arbitrator and legal counsel of one of the parties,
say the claimant, in two similar arbitrations, there exists a
ICSID CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 15.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
26
27
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reasonable suspicion of bias towards the claimant in the
former arbitration. The author argues that this suspicion of
bias exists for the duration of that arbitration only. 34
However, the question of whether the bias remains when the
arbitration is complete remains unanswered.
Ordinarily, the tribunal’s role is complete once an
award is passed. 35 Despite the possibility of additional
awards on ancillary procedural matters, such as costs, for all
practical purposes, the tribunal is non-existent after the
award is rendered.36 In such a situation, it may be reasonable
to conclude that the suspicion of bias is non-existent after the
award is rendered. The arbitrator could then perhaps join
another arbitration as legal counsel. This demarcation is
crucial to resolve the earlier discussed problem of the new
generation of arbitrators who switch back and forth—
playing the dual role of arbitrators and legal counsel before
serving as a full-time arbitrator. Prior discourse by the
international community suggests either a cap on the number
of times a person can serve in a dual role before becoming a
full-time arbitrator, or a two-year cooling-off period.37 This
is problematic because of the highly subjective nature of the
arbitration. 38 There can be no single number which can
reasonably justify a restriction. The argument for limiting
double-hatting only for the duration of the arbitration,

Id.
See American Arbitration Association, What Happens After the Arbitrator
Issues
an
Award,
AAA229
1,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA229_After_
Award_Issued.pdf.
36
Id.
37
Id. at n.12; Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn, & Runar Lie, The Ethics and
Empirics of Double-hatting, 6 ESIL REFLECTIONS (ISSUE 7), July 24, 2017, at
7.
38
See Elie Kleiman & Claire Pauly, Arbitrability and Public Policy Challenges,
Global
Arbitration
Review
(2019),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-challenging-andenforcing-arbitration-awards/1st-edition/article/arbitrability-and-publicpolicy-challenges.
34
35
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however, is reasonable and adequately addresses limitations
such as those faced by new generation of arbitrators.
However, the author argues that rendering an award
should not determine whether an arbitrator should be
allowed to become a double-hatter. This is because an
arbitral tribunal that has become functus officio after passing
the award may reconvene to render an additional award
clarifying, correcting, rectifying, or interpreting the rendered
award. 39 As a result, the tribunal’s role may never be
complete until the award is fully enforced and the dispute
between the parties is permanently settled.
Thus,
enforcement of the award becomes the final nail in the coffin.
With the option to challenge an award either under
the lex arbitri at the court of arbitration or to object to the
recognition of the award, the enforcement proceedings may
sometimes be tedious and time consuming.40 Consequently,
the opportunity to double-hat could be delayed. The author,
however, argues that this must not be given paramount
importance. In the quest to safeguard the rights of the parties,
the arbitral process has allowed for a system of checks and
balances, which is more than what is necessary.41 Delayed
enforcement of awards speaks volumes about the tribunal’s
merit. If the tribunal were either to resolve the dispute in a
manner that was amicable to both the parties or leave no
stone unturned during the entire arbitral process, there would
See New York City Bar, The Functus Officio Problem in Modern Arbitration
and
a
Proposed
Solution,
NYCBAR.ORG
(2021),
https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reportslisting/reports/detail/functus-officio-problem-in-arbitration-and-a-proposedsolution.
40
See Michael Ostrove, James Carter & Ben Sanderson, Awards: Challenges,
Global
Arbitration
Review
(2021)
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-challenging-andenforcing-arbitration-awards/2nd-edition/article/awards-challenges.
41
See Richard M. Alderman, What’s Really Wrong With Forced Consumer
Arbitration?,
ABA.ORG
(2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2010/11/0
3_alderman/.
39

73
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be little scope for the losing party to object to the
enforcement of the award.
Thus, despite the potential delay, once an award is
enforced, the question of suspicion of bias becomes nonexistent. The restriction on double-hatting can be lifted once
an award is enforced, i.e., double-hatting must be restricted
only for the duration of the concurrent arbitration. Such an
approach can be adopted in both investment arbitrations and
commercial arbitrations.
In conclusion, on the second prong, the author
suggests:
Parameter
International International
investment
commercial
arbitrations
arbitrations
Personnel
Judges,
Arbitrators or Legal
Agents
or Counsels.
Legal
Counsels.
Duration Till the time Till the time the
the
arbitral arbitral award is
award
is enforced
enforced
Table 2 Parameters Defined—Personnel and Duration.42
Thirdly, the most crucial aspect of identifying cases
of double-hatting is the circumstances which would lead to
suspicion of bias or conflict.43 Article 6 has suggested the
following criteria upon the fulfilment of which the individual
may be categorized as a double-hatter: “ . . . on matters that
involve the same parties, [the same facts,] [and/or] [the same
ICSID CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 15.
E.g., Secratariats of ICSID & UNCITRAL, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, Draft Code of Conduct for
Adjudicators in Investor-State Disputes Settlement: Version One [hereinafter
Draft
Code
Version
One],
17
(May
1,
2020),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/Draft_Code_Condu
ct_Adjudicators_ISDS.pdf.
42
43
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treaty].”44 The author identifies ambiguity concerning three
aspects in this text: first, do the same parties mean either
party? Second, what is the scope of “same facts”? And third,
whether the triple requirement of same parties, same facts,
and same treaty is cumulative.45
To begin with, the author argues that double-hatting
must be restricted if either of the parties are present in the
other arbitration. This is relevant in instances where one
state has multiple concurrent Investor-State Disputes
Settlement (“ISDS”) proceedings. If the individual is a
judge in a proceeding involving state X in one arbitration and
an agent of state X in another arbitration involving the same
state, the individual may form a bias towards state X in the
former arbitration. In the alternative, if the individual is
legal counsel arguing against state X in the other arbitration,
the individual may form a bias against the state in the former
arbitration. Either way, it is crucial to ensure that both
parties are not present in the second arbitration.
Further, the author argues that until and unless the
arbitration proceedings have re-commenced with a different
tribunal, no two arbitrations can possibly be the “same.”46
The use of the words “same arbitrations” is, therefore,
problematic. Instead, the use of the phrase “similar
arbitrations” is suggested. Similar arbitrations could mean
arbitrations relating to similar issues of law, etc., which is
also crucial because an inclination favouring one
interpretation of the law could cloud an arbitrator’s
judgement.
Furthermore, the text of Article 6 mentioned
“[and/or].” 47 The application of either or all the criteria
would have different implications on the scope of the
restriction. Given the cascading effect of each of the
Draft Code Version One, supra note 43, at 16.
E.g., id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
44
45
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individual criterion, the author argues for the application of
any of the three circumstances which would warrant a
restriction on double-hatting. Thus, restriction on doublehatting must be enacted in cases of the same parties, similar
facts, or the same treaties.
In cases of commercial arbitration, however, it is
crucial to understand the varied interpretations of the
provisions of lex arbitri and the biasness that may ensue. In
juxtaposition to the use of the word “seat,” the author argues
for the inclusion of lex arbitri, as it is a broader term
encompassing the legal landscape of the arbitration,
including the arbitral rules and other soft law provisions.48
Furthermore, considering the business landscape, it is crucial
to include “existence of business relationships” within the
ambit of “either” parties. For example, in two concurrent
arbitrations involving parties with business relationships, the
legal counsel of one of the parties in one arbitration might
favor a related party having business relationships with the
client the legal counsel serves as an arbitrator in another
arbitration involving the related party. Considering the legal
counsel’s reasonable degree of influence due to such an
existence, it must also be restricted.49
Regarding the inclusion of the term “similar facts,”
the author agrees with the text of Article 6 to the extent of its
applicability in commercial arbitration cases as well. 50 In
conclusion, the author suggests:

NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 22–3 (Oxford University Press, 6th ed. 2015).
49
See generally Draft Code Version One, supra note 43, at ¶ 73.
50
Draft Code Version One, supra note 43 at 16.
48
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Parameter
Personnel

Duration

International
investment
arbitrations
Judges,
Agents
or
Legal
Counsels.
Till the time
the
arbitral
award
is
enforced
On
matters
that involve
either of the
parties
or
similar facts
or same treaty

International
investment
arbitrations
Arbitrators or
Legal
Counsels.

Till the time
the
arbitral
award
is
enforced
Circumstances
On
matters
that involve
either of the
parties,
including
parties with
whom there
exists
business
relationships,
or
similar
facts or same
lex arbitri
Table 3 parameters defined—Personnel, Duration and
Circumstances51
Thus, the following definitions of double-hatting
may be provided: in international investment arbitrations,
juxtaposed to Article 6 of the Draft Code, the concept of
double-hatting may provide that adjudicators shall refrain
from acting as judges, agents, or legal counsel until the time
the arbitral award is enforced on matters involving either of
the parties, similar facts, or same treaties.52 In international
51
52

Id.
Cf. Id.
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commercial arbitrations, double-hatting may provide that
arbitrators shall refrain from simultaneously acting as legal
counsel, until the time the arbitral award is enforced, on
matters involving either of the parties, including parties with
whom either party has a business relationships, similar facts,
or same lex arbitri.
III.
Draft Code of Conduct 2.0
In April 2021, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) published the second version of the Draft
Code of Conduct (“Draft Code”) with substantial change to
the language of Article 6. 53 The revised version of the
Article, now renumbered Article 4, gives the parties the
autonomy to agree on a double-hatting arbitrator.54 Article
4 reads: “Unless the disputing parties agree otherwise, an
Adjudicator in an [International Investment Dispute (“IID”)]
proceeding shall not act concurrently as counsel or expert
witness in another IID case (involving the same factual
background and at least one of the same parties or their
subsidiary, affiliate or parent entity).”55
The explanation for changes in the Draft Code also
highlights that the square bracketed portion of the Article
presents a possible tailormade provision that would prohibit
specific instances.56
This second version of the Article presents itself
with dangerous consequences, far worse than the earlier
version of the draft article. 57 In an arbitration, it is
Secratariats of ICSID & UNCITRAL, Draft Code of Conduct for
Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes: Version Two [hereinafter
Draft Code Version Two], Art. 4 ICSID (April 19, 2021),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/draft_code_of_conduct_v2_en_fi
nal.pdf.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
Id.
53

78

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss1/3

14

Devarakonda: Restricting Double-Hatting
[Vol. 22: 65, 2022]

Restricting Double-Hatting
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

unfathomable to allow the disputing parties to agree out of
the problem of double-hatting. Party autonomy is not
absolute—limitations on party autonomy must exist. One
such limitation is compliance with mandatory provisions of
the law. In spirit, this limitation implies mandatory
compliance with the overarching aims of the arbitration
mechanism. Albeit disputed, double-hatting is recognized
as having a negative impact on the legitimacy of
arbitration. 58 It would, therefore, be a blunder to have a
legislative document actively allowing the parties to agree
on such a practice. Practically, the disputing parties would
not even agree on such appointments. Each party would
object to the proposal of the opposite party to appoint their
party-appointed-arbitrator who is a double-hatter.
Potentially, only chair arbitrators could be appointed in this
manner, the consent for which must be obtained from the coarbitrators and not the parties.59 From this perspective, the
draft Article 4 in the current form appears to have missed out
on being pragmatic in their approach.60
Additionally, the presence of the square-bracketed
portion of Article 4—along with the possibility of the
agreement between disputing parties is ironical.61 If party
agreement on double-hatters as arbitrators is an exception
that was already made, there must not be any reason to water
down the provision further. Because it is not the case that
party autonomy is limited by the instances mentioned in the
square bracketed portion of the provision, the absence of a
party agreement must strictly mean that double-hatting is not
permissible.62
Langford et al., supra note 4, at 2.
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Number of
Arbitrators and Method of Appointment, WORLDBANK.ORG (2021),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/services/arbitration/convention/process/appointme
nt.
60
Draft Code Version Two, supra note 53, at Art. 4.
61
Id.
62
Id.
58
59

79
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Therefore, the second version of the Article
concerning double-hatting is more problematic than the first.
In the author’s opinion, this is not a matter which must be
left to the disputing parties to decide on. There must be a
comprehensive framework governing the issue of doublehatting. For this reason, further sections of this paper are
analyzed considering Article 6 in the first Draft Code, and
not the second version of the Article.
IV.
Framework For Implementation of Restriction
on Double-hatting in International Commercial
Arbitrations
Having arrived at a comprehensive definition of
double-hatting tailor made for international commercial
arbitrations and having discussed the need for ensuring a
restriction, the following section is an attempt to suggest an
outline which could aid in enforcing the elucidated
restriction.
In Section II of this article, the author defined
restriction on double-hatting in the following manner:
“Arbitrators shall refrain from simultaneously acting as legal
counsel, until the time the arbitral award is enforced on
matters involving either of the parties, including parties with
whom there exists business relationships, similar facts, or
same lex arbitri.”
In International Commercial Arbitrations (“ICAs”),
where party autonomy and freedom to contract are of utmost
importance due to privacy and confidentiality, there is hardly
anything that the international community can do that would
effect a universal change addressing a bottleneck, such as
double-hatting (which is clogging the system of effective
dispute resolution).63 However, considering the wide range
NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 355 (Oxford University Press, 6th ed. 2009); Kona Village
Realty Inc v. Sunstone Realty Partners, XIV, 123 Haw. 476, 478; Aita v. Ojjeh,
1986 Revue De L'Arbitrage 583 (Cour d’Appel de Paris, Feb. 18, 1986); Jan
Paulsson & Nigel Rawding, The Trouble with Confidentiality, 11 ARBITRATION
INTERNATIONAL 303, 320 (1995).
63

80
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of applicability and popularity of the soft law provisions, the
author suggests suitable amendments to it. 64 These
suggestions could be the first step toward realizing a
regulated regime of double-hatting in international
commercial arbitrations.65
A detailed analysis of the following will be
undertaken:
1. UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration
2. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration
3. Reforms by Arbitral Institutions
Albeit a more widely recognized instrument with
over 165 countries as contracting states, the author does not
argue for an amendment to the New York Arbitration
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 1958 for two reasons.66 First, Article VII
of the convention only sets a minimum standard which
allows for the states to be liberal.67 In such a scenario, even
if a mechanism to restrict double- hatting were to be
introduced, the states could potentially circumvent the
same.68 Second, the grounds under which the recognition
and enforcement of the award may be refused under Article
V of the convention are already incorporated in Chapters VII
and VIII of the Model Law.69 Thus, the inter alia argued
amendment to the Model Law would suffice.
See generally Draft Code Version Two, supra note 53.
Id.
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS, 1958 (330 UNTS 3).
67
Emmanuel Gaillard, The Urgency of Not Revising the New York Convention,
FIFTY YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 692 (2009).
68
Aita v. Ojjeh, 1986 Revue De L'Arbitrage 583 (Cour d’Appel de Paris, Feb.
18, 1986); Jan Paulsson & Nigel Rawding, The Trouble with Confidentiality,
11 Arbitration International 303, 320 (1995).
69
Gary B. Born, The New York Convention: A Self-Executing Treaty, 40
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 176 (2018).
64
65
66
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A.
UNCITRAL
Model
Law
on
International Commercial Arbitrations
In 1985, the UNCITRAL Secretariat suggested a
model legislation (“Model Law”) on commercial
arbitrations for the consideration of lawmakers across
jurisdictions who may choose to adopt, either in part or in
full, the text of the Model Law as part of their domestic
legislation governing commercial arbitrations. 70 Since its
inception, and with the latest amendments in 2006, over 116
jurisdictions across eighty-three states have incorporated
this suggested pattern into their respective domestic
legislations. 71 Considering its wide reach, the author
suggests additional amendments to the relevant provisions
of the Model Law to enforce a restriction on double-hatting.
The domestic legislations that have adopted the Model Law
may then effect similar amendments.72 This is significant
because these domestic legislations comprise the law of the
potential seat of an arbitration. 73 An international
commercial arbitration must comply with the mandatory
provisions of the law of the seat.74 If the Model Law were
to restrict the practice of double-hatting, then arbitrations in
those jurisdictions that have amended their domestic
legislations to impose a similar restriction would have to
ensure mandatory compliance. With a greater number of
jurisdictions imposing such restrictions, the unfettered
practice of double-hatting would eventually cease to exist.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, 1985 (40/72).
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], Rep. on the Status of
Conventions and Model Laws, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1020 (2020).
72
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], Frequently Asked Questions—
UNCITRAL Texts, https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/texts (last visited Sept.
23, 2021) ("UNCITRAL legislative texts, such as conventions, model laws, and
legislative guides, may be adopted by States through the enactment of domestic
legislation.").
73
Id.
74
Id.
70
71

82
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An amendment to the text of the Model Law is,
however, complex. 75 Prior to delving into any suitably
amendable provisions, one must consider the amendment
procedure. In 2006, recognizing the need to adapt to modern
advancements in the field of arbitration, and expressing
appreciation for the crucial recommended interpretation of
Articles II and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution amending
the Model Law. 76 The amendments, via revisions to its
various articles, intended to modernize the form requirement
of an arbitration agreement.77 While observers may consider
a mere amendment to effect a restriction on double-hatting
trivial, revisiting the Model Law fourteen years after its
previous amendment does seem necessary. Considering that
the prior amendment was a revision to only a few chapters
of the Model Law, it may perhaps be an ideal time to focus
on the other chapters as well. The author considers
amendments to Chapters III and VII as necessary for
implementing a restriction on double-hatting. Articles 11
and 34 of the Model Law may be amended in the following
manner:
Article 11 provides the procedure for appointing
arbitrators.78 Elaborated over five subclauses, this provision
gives autonomy to the parties in determining appointments
and prescribes recourse if the parties do not make such a
determination. 79 A restriction on appointing an arbitrator
who is at risk of being a double-hatter may be an optimum
See generally Dyalá Jiménez-Figueres, Are We Beyond the Model Law—Or
Is It Time For A New One?, KLUWERARBITRATION.COM
(2013),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2013/05/24/are-we-beyond-themodel-law-or-is-it-time-for-a-new-one/; See also UNCITRAL Model L. on
Int'l Arb.: 1985: With Amends. as Adopted in 2006 [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Model Law] Art. 11 (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. 1985) (amended 2006).
76
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 75, at Art. 11.
77
Id.
78
Draft Code Version Two, supra note 53, at 11.
79
Id.
75
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way to proscribe this problem. After a thorough perusal of
Article 11, and considering the author’s definition of doublehatting, the following presents a possible additional subclause to Article 11:
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
foregoing provisions of this article, an arbitrator who is
simultaneously acting as legal counsel in a similar matter
involving either of the parties, including parties with whom
there exists business relationships, similar facts, or same lex
arbitri, cannot be appointed as an arbitrator until the arbitral
award in the other arbitration has been enforced.
This non-obstante clause is important because
restrictions on double-hatting can only be tackled by limiting
party autonomy.80 The proposed addition of sub-clause 6
would supersede all other sub-clauses in Article 11,
including those that allow alternative methods of arbitrator
appointments, such as court appointed arbitrators. 81
Therefore, this sub-clause not only binds the appointed
arbitrators who would appoint the presiding arbitrator under
Article 11(3)(a), but also binds the national courts or other
competent authorities who may be entrusted with the task of
appointments under Article 11(5).
In addition to regulating the arbitrator appointments,
for effective restriction on double-hatting, it is crucial to
enable a mechanism that would provide the parties for a
recourse against an arbitral award. 82 When an arbitral
tribunal has a double-hatter, a biased award is presumed.83
Under such circumstances, the party must be empowered to
Frederick A. Acomb, The Insider Adversary in International Arbitration, 27
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 63, 72 (2016).
81
See DRAFT CODE VERSION TWO, supra note 53, at 11.
82
See Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008)
(holding that Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–
11, are the exclusive grounds for appealing an arbitration award).
83
Antonia Eliason, Evident Partiality and the Judicial Review of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Awards: An Argument for ISD Awards, 50 GEO. J. INT’L L.
1, 9 (2018).
80

84
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apply for the court to set aside the award under Article 34.84
The author argues that such a watertight mechanism would
also discourage the parties to appoint arbitrators who are
double-hatters because an award set aside by the court is
against the interests of the parties to the dispute. The author
suggests an amendment to Article 34(2)(a)(iv), which in its
current form implies that an arbitral tribunal constituted in
contravention with the proposed Article 11(6) would trigger
the application of Article 34(2)(a)(iv). 85 However, the
author argues there may be ambiguity as to whether Article
11(6) is subject to the agreement between the parties. To
address any such ambiguity, the author suggests inclusion of
the following phrase to Article 34(2)(a)(iv):
. . . [F]ailing such agreement, was
not in accordance with this law, or, if,
under any circumstance, the arbitral
tribunal consisted of an arbitrator who was
simultaneously acting as a legal counsel in
a similar matter involving either of the
parties, including parties with whom there
exists business relationships, similar facts,
or same lex arbitri; or . . . .
The inclusion of the suggested phrase at the end of
the sub-clause clearly demarcates the three instances in
which the composition of the tribunal may lead to the award
being challenged. 86 The first and second instances,
respectively, concern whether the parties’ agreement was
given primacy and whether the mandatory law provisions
have been followed. 87 The third instance overrides any
agreement between the parties and provides a mechanism to
See U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade L., U.N. Model Law on Commercial
Arbitration [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration],
at 19–20, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex I (2008).
85
See id. at 20.
86
See UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration, supra note 84, at
6–9.
87
Id.
84

85
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apply for challenging an award if an arbitrator was a doublehatter during the entire arbitral proceedings. 88 Such a
mechanism addresses concerns of non-disclosure by an
arbitrator at the time of appointment.
In conclusion, the proposed amendments to the text
of Articles 11 and 34 would serve as an effective tool to
implement restrictions on double-hatting. The roadmap for
implementation would be quicker and smoother in those
commercial contracts where the Model Law itself has been
agreed upon by the parties as the proper law of the arbitration.
In the alternative, if the parties agree on a particular
jurisdiction’s law, implementing the proposed manner of
restriction could be a long-drawn process as the domestic
legislation must first be amended per the proposed
amendments to the Model Law. Either way, restricted
double-hatting would eventually become the norm.
B.
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest
in International Commercial Arbitrations
Albeit a soft law, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts
of Interest in International Commercial Arbitrations (“IBA
Guidelines”) is perhaps the only legal instrument which has
come close to addressing the issue of double-hatting. 89
Introduced in 2004, the IBA Guidelines are often consulted
by parties during the evaluation of arbitrators prior to their
appointment.90 The IBA Guidelines prescribe the coveted
“test of independence and impartiality” of an arbitrator.91 To
ensure a fair resolution of the dispute to the parties, the test
of the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator is
quintessential. The standard for this test is of more
Id.
INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
i
(2014),
https://www.ibanet.org/MediaHandler?id=e2fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10dd33dafee8918 [hereinafter IBA Guidelines].
90
IBA Guidelines, supra note 89.
91
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1817 (2d ed.,
2014).
88
89

86
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importance because the arbitrators are appointed by the
parties themselves. 92 At the stage of appointment, the
parties evaluate the arbitrators’ profiles and raise objections
they believe the arbitrators might not be independent or
impartial. 93 Therefore, it is essential to ensure that the
appointment of a party-appointed arbitrator is not objected
to by the opposite party.94 The parties in this regard often
resort to the IBA Guidelines.95
The IBA Guidelines’ 2014 revisions introduced
sweeping changes, reflecting their evolving nature. 96
Initially introduced to govern both forms of arbitrations, the
lingering uncertainty with respect to its application on
international investment arbitrations was resolved with the
emergence of a general consensus amongst the members of
the IBA Review Committee that these guidelines apply to
both the arbitrations alike.97 Amongst the slew of changes
introduced via the 2014 revision, the introduction of
“advanced waivers” stands out. 98 General Standard 3(b),
requiring the arbitrators to declare or waive off any potential
future conflict of interest in advance, indirectly touches upon
the issue of double-hatting.99 A conjoint reading of entry
2.1.1 in the Non-Waivable Red List and entries 3.1.1 and
3.1.2 in the Orange List in Part II of the IBA Guidelines can

Id.
IBA Guidelines, supra note 89 at 9.
94
Id.
95
Id. at i.
96
Megan K. Niedermeyer, Ethics for Arbitrators at the International Level:
Who Writes the Rules of the Game? 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 481, 481 (2014)
(discussing the 2014 updates to the IBA Guidelines); see also IBA Guidelines,
supra note 89.
97
Id. at 489–90, 495.
98
Compare IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at 7–9, with INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA
GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(2004),
https://sccinstitute.com/media/37100/iba_publications_arbitration_guidelines_
2004.pdf.
99
IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at 8–9.
92
93

87
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be understood as limiting restrictions on double-hatting.100
Although this inclusion in Part II of the IBA Guidelines
would perhaps suffice, the author argues in favor of
restricting double-hatting in Part I of the IBA Guidelines as
well. The 2014 revised General Standard 3(b) reads: “[a]n
advance declaration or waiver in relation to possible
conflicts of interest arising from facts and circumstances that
may arise in the future does not discharge the arbitrator’s
ongoing duty of disclosure under General Standard 3(a).”101
Perhaps the general lack of discourse regarding the
importance of restricting double-hatting in the international
commercial arbitration arena is the reason for the lack of
explicit wording regarding double-hatting.102 Considering
the foregone discussion with regard to the importance of the
restriction on double-hatting in both the forms of arbitrations
alike, the author proposes the inclusion of the following
terms to the text of General Standard 3(b) 103:
“ . . . facts and circumstances that
may arise in the future, including the
possibility of the arbitrator agreeing to play
the role of a legal counsel in an arbitration
involving either of the parties, including
parties with whom there exists business
relationships, similar facts, or same lex
arbitri, does not discharge the arbitrator’s
ongoing duty of disclosure . . . .”
The proposed inclusion touches upon one of the
most crucial flipside aspects of double-hatting. 104
Restriction on appointment of arbitrators who are doublehatters would only restrict legal counsel from becoming
arbitrators under the discussed circumstances. 105 It is,
Id. at 20, 22.
IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at 8.
102
Cf. IBA Guidelines, supra note 89.
103
Id. at 8.
104
See IBA Guidelines, supra note 89.
105
Cf. Langford et al., supra note 4.
100
101

88
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however, possible for an arbitrator to become a double-hatter
upon appointment.106 The proposed inclusion to the General
Standard 3(b) would now necessitate the arbitrator to declare
that they would not, in the future, agree to double-hat.
As earlier noted, the entries in Part II are “nonexhaustive,” and the already-existing entries (2.1.1, 3.1.1,
and 3.1.2) would sufficiently govern the restriction on
double-hatting. 107 Considering the proposed inclusion to
General Standard 3(b), the author suggests including a
separate entry clarifying the precise nature of the potential
impartiality that the guidelines seek to arrest. 108 Part II
contains three different lists—the Red List, Orange List, and
Green List—and classifies four instances of potential
conflict in the decreasing order of their severity: NonWaivable Red List, Waivable Red List, Orange List, and
Green List.109 It is crucial to categorize an entry specifying
the restriction on double-hatting into one of these lists. Entry
2.1.1 in the Waivable Red List and entries 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 in
the Orange List could be relevant in ascertaining placement
in the appropriate list.110 The Waivable Red List provides
instances of disclosures of conflict which would raise
“justifiable doubt[s]” related to independence and
impartiality but may be expressly waived by an agreement
between the parties. 111 On the other hand, the instances
elucidated in the Orange List create a legal fiction. 112
Additionally, “[i]f, following [the arbitrator’s conflict
disclosures,] the parties fail to raise any timely objections,

Cf. id.
ICSID DOUBLE-HATTING, supra note 18; See also IBA Guidelines, supra
note 89.
108
IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at 20, 22.
109
Id. at 17–27.
110
Id. at 20, 22.
111
See ARIF HYDER ALI, JANE WESSEL, ALEXANDRE DE GRAMONT, & RYAN
MELLSKE, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULEBOOK: A GUIDE TO
ARBITRATION REGIMES 287 (Kluwer L. Int’l 2019).
112
Id. at 287–88.
106
107

89
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the parties are deemed to have accepted the arbitrator.” 113
The vital distinction between the two lists is of paramount
importance because disclosure of double-hatting is
continuous (i.e., the arbitrator may disclose an instance of
double-hatting at any time during the arbitral process).114 If
the disclosure of an instance of double-hatting by the
arbitrator during the proceedings is categorized in the
Waivable Red List, the parties would be compelled to either
agree to waive off the disclosed conflict or risk the
termination of the arbitral proceedings—leading to
reappointment of a new arbitrator or reconstitution of the
arbitral tribunal itself. 115 If a disclosed instance is
categorized in the Orange List, the arbitration proceedings
would be preserved unless the parties choose to raise a
timely objection.116 The author argues in favor of the latter
approach in the interest of pro-arbitration principles. Unless
grave circumstances warrant a premature termination, it is
pivotal to ensure that the arbitration proceedings go on.117
Therefore, the author proposes the following entry as an
amendment to the Orange List:
3.1 Previous services for one of the parties or other
involvement in the case . . . .118
3.1.6 The arbitrator is currently acting as a legal
counsel in an arbitration involving either of the parties,
including parties with whom there exists business
relationships, similar facts, or same lex arbitri.
Since the IBA guidelines are soft law provisions,
their lack of binding nature on the parties would impede the
full-fledged implementation of the proposed restriction on
Id.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 287.
117
IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at 1–2.
118
Id. at 22–23.
113
114

90
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double-hatting unless the guidelines are expressly agreed
upon, or, in the alternative, actively resorted to by the
tribunal.119 Therefore, the author argues for a synchronous
shift in approach to arbitrator appointments with the
proposed institutional reforms.
C.
Reforms by Arbitral Institutions
Many commercial arbitrations take place with the
aid and assistance of arbitral institutions. 120 These
institutions are self-regulated, autonomous bodies that
facilitate the arbitrations conducted under their aegis. 121
Parties (either via an arbitration clause in their commercial
contracts or in agreements to arbitrate the dispute) agree on
applying the arbitral rules of any of these institutions. 122
These rules form a part of governing the procedural aspects
of the arbitration.123 The author argues that these institutions
must undertake the responsibility of ensuring the best
practices and suitably ensure that the arbitrator appointments,
either via the institution’s panel of arbitrators or via the
parties who are arbitrating their dispute under the institution,
must not lead to double-hatting.
Under the Singapore International Arbitration
Centre (“SIAC”), for instance, amendments may be made to
Clauses 2 and 3 of the Code of Ethics for an Arbitrator
governing disclosure and bias, respectively.124 In the same
vein, provisions restricting double-hatting may be
introduced to Article 16(4) of the Vienna Rules of
Arbitration and Mediation 2018 of the Vienna International
Arbitration Centre (“VIAC”) 125 and Section 2 of London
Id. at 3.
ALI ET AL., supra note 111, at 122–24.
121
Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, OHIO STATE
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 371 (2004).
122
ALI ET AL., supra note 111, at 123.
123
Id.
124
SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., CODE OF ETHICS FOR AN ARBITRATOR, cl. 2, 3
(2015).
125
VIENNA INT’L ARB. CTR., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES, art. 16(4)
(2018).
119
120

91
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Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Notes for
Arbitrators. 126 These clauses govern the aspects of
independence and impartiality of an arbitrator and may be
suitable for introducing such an amendment.127 The author
refrains from delving into the precise nature and wording of
the amendments to these institutional rules because, first,
these rules are tailor-made to meet the needs and demands of
the institutions’ clients. Second, the rules are specific to the
jurisdiction in which the arbitral institution is located. 128
The arbitral rules of SIAC, VIAC, and LCIA, for instance,
are in synergy with the domestic legislations in Singapore,
Vienna, and London, respectively. 129 Irrespective of the
manner, method, and extent of incorporation, the role of the
arbitral institutions in realizing the successful
implementation of the restriction on double-hatting is
unparalleled.
Thus, the cumulative effect of the suggested
framework would eventually lead to the implementation of
a restriction on double-hatting, which has been a cog in the
wheel of the institutional efficiency in international
arbitrations.
V.
Conclusion
With the advent of modern means of efficient
dispute resolution processes, the popularity of international
arbitration has skyrocketed.130 This rise also demands for
LONDON COURT INT’L ARB., NOTES FOR ARBS. at sec. 2 (2017).
Id. See also SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., CODE OF ETHICS FOR AN ARBITRATOR,
cl. 2, 3 (2015); VIENNA INT’L ARB. CTR., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
RULES, art. 16(4) (2018).
128
See Mark Lakin & Nicholas Sharratt, Dispute resolution clauses: Drafting
Principles and Concepts, STEPHENSON HARWOOD (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.shlegal.com/news/dispute-resolution-clauses-drafting-principlesand-concepts.
129
See SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., CODE OF ETHICS FOR AN ARBITRATOR (2015);
VIENNA INT’L ARB. CENTRE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES (2018);
LONDON COURT INT’L ARB., NOTES FOR ARBS. (2017).
130
See Gary Born & Wendy Miles, Global Trends in International Arbitration,
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP: SPECIAL ADVERTISING
SECTION,
126
127

92
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the arbitration process to remain legitimate and impartial.
Presently, the practice of double-hatting, in the absence of
adequate safeguards, is permeating the institution of
arbitration, infesting the arbitral process, and giving rise to
procedural injustice ultimately plaguing the international
justice system.
A ubiquitous effort to weed out double-hatting fell
short of its desired objective.131 Because the proposed draft
code is in its nascent stage, with comments and suggestions
from the arbitration community yet awaited, there is scope
for revisiting the discourse and revising Article 4. The
author emphasises the need to adopt a dynamic approach,
such as the one suggested, in this regard.
Separately, the lack of any effort to concurrently
address the same issue in international commercial
arbitrations is appalling. The IBA guidelines are the only
soft law instrument that tackle the issue of double-hatting,
albeit inadequately. 132 The suggested comprehensive
framework for the implementation of a restriction on doublehatting in international commercial arbitrations would be a
welcomed step toward a slow, yet steady process of ensuring
a well, safeguarded method of double-hatting that patches its
draw backs. Concomitant amendments to the UNCITRAL
Model Law and IBA Guidelines, along with synchronous
institutional reforms, present an optimal solution and is the
way forward.

https://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/812/Global-Trendsin-International-Arbitration.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
131
Tayar, supra note 7, at 111–13.
132
Id. at 117.
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